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SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: EXPANDING THE
PURPOSE PRONG OF THE LEMON TEST
Santa Fe IndependentSchool Districtv. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)
SaraS. Davis*
Petitioner's policy' allowed students to deliver a prayer or address prior
to home football games.2 The stated purposes of the policy were to foster
free expression, solemnize the event, promote sportsmanship, and establish
the appropriate environment for the competition Respondents challenged
the policy, asserting that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment." The district court ordered Petitioner to require all student
addresses to be non-sectarian and non-proselytizing. Both Petitioner and
* To my parents, Harvey and Susan Davis, for all their love and support and my
irreplaceable friends for their understanding.
1. The text of the policy read:
STUDENT ACTIVITIES:
PRE-GAME CEREMONIES AT FOOTBALL GAMES
The board has chosen to permit students to deliver a brief invocation and/or
message to be delivered during the pre-game ceremonies of home varsity football
games to solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and student safety,
and to establish the appropriate environment for the competition.
Upon advice and direction of the high school principal, each spring the high
school student council shall conduct an election, by the student body, by secret
ballot, to determine whether such a statement or invocation will be a part of the
pre-game ceremonies and if so, shall elect a student from the list of student
volunteers, to deliver the statement or invocation. The student volunteer who is
selected by his or her classmates may decide what message and/or invocation to
deliver, consistent with the goals and purposes of this policy. Any message and/or
invocation delivered by a student must be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,298 n.6 (2000).
2. Id. at 294.
3. Id. at 309. Petitioner later re-stated its purpose as to "foste[r] free expression of private
persons... as well [as to] solemniz[e] sporting events, promot[e] good sportsmanship and student
safety and establis[h] an appropriate environment for competition." Id.
4. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806,811 (5th Cir. 1999), aft'd,530 U.S. 290
(2000). The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances:' U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. Doe, 168 F.3d at 812. Prior to the district court's order, petitioner's policy contained no
requirement governing the content of the student-led message or invocation. Id. However, the
policy did contain a provision that provided for the addition of a nonsectarian, nonproselytizing
content limitation should the petitioner be enjoined from enforcing the policy. Id.
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Respondents appealed the decision and the appellate court affirmed in part
and reversed in part, ultimately holding the policy unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari 7 and, in affirming the appellate court's
decision, HELD, that the policy of allowing non-sectarian, nonproselytizing addresses prior to home football games violated the
Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion. ' Historically, courts have had
difficulty drawing the line between permissible actions that may benefit
religion and those that violate the Establishment Clause.!* In Lemon v.
Kurtzman," the Court established a three-part test to determine whether a
government action or policy violated the Establishment Clause.2
In Lemon, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of two state statutes
that provided supplemental salaries to teachers at non-public schools. 3 In
deciding that both statutes violated the Establishment Clause, the Court
applied a three-part test.1 4 This test, now known as the Lemon Test,
requires a government act or policy to have a secular purpose, have a
primary or principal effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and
avoid fostering an excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 5
The Court indicated that, if a policy or statute did not meet all three
requirements of the Lemon Test, it would violate the Establishment
Clause. 16 Applying the test to the case before it, the Court determined that
both state statutes involved excessive interaction between the government
and religiously affiliated schools. 7 The Court, therefore, concluded that

6. Id. at 824. The portion of the appellate court's holding that is most relevant to the instant
case is its reversal of the district court's decision that Petitioner's policy of allowing nonsectarian,
nonproselytizing student messages or invocations is permissible. See id.
7. Doe, 530 U.S. at 301. The Court limited it's consideration of the matter to the narrow
issue of "[w]hether petitioner's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football
games violates the Establishment Clause." Id.
8. ld. at 317.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
10. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
11. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
12. Id. at 612.
13. Id. at 606. The Rhode Island statute allowed the state to supplement the salaries of
teachers of secular curriculum in private elementary schools. Id. at 607. The state paid the
supplement directly to the teachers. Id. The Pennsylvania Statute provided that the state could
directly reimburse private schools for actual expenditures for the costs of secular educational
services. Id. at 609. Both statutes provided benefits to religious and non-religious private schools.
Id. at 606.
14. Id. at 612.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 613.
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both statutes had the cumulative effect of fostering an excessive
entanglement of government and religion."8
Despite finding the statutes unconstitutional, the Court recognized that
each statute had a legitimate purpose: to enhance the quality of secular
education.19 The Court went further, holding that, because no reason
existed to question this stated secular purpose, it would afford the purpose
deference and find it valid under the purpose prong.20Applying the purpose
prong of the Lemon Test in light of this notion of deference was a central
issue of the Court's decision in Lynch v. Donnelly.21
In Lynch, the Court refused to hold that city sponsorship of a nativity
scene, displayed during the holiday season, violated the Establishment
Clause.22 Rather, the Court held that the city's display had the valid secular
purpose of celebrating the Christmas holiday and depicting its origins.23
The Court was unwilling to charge the city with having an implied intent
to advocate a certain religious message.'
In its decision, the Court took special note that displaying the nativity
scene did not violate the purpose prong of the Lemon Test because the
display was not wholly motivated by religious considerations. 26

18. Id. at 614.
19. Id. at 613. The Court did not find it necessary to consider whether the primary or
principle effect of the statutes was to advance religion. Id. This issue was not considered because
the Court found clear evidence of excessive entanglement of government and religion, which gave
it ample ground to declare the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 613-14.
20. See id. at 613. The language of the Court's opinion is particularly relevant because it is
indicative of the Court's reluctance to look past the government actor's stated secular purpose. The
relevant portion of the opinion reads:
Inquiry into the legislative purposes ofthePennsylvaniaand RhodeIsland statutes
affords no basis fora conclusion that the legislative intent was to advance religion.
On the contrary, the statutes themselves clearly state that they are intended to
enhance the quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the
compulsory attendance laws. There is no reason to believe the legislatures meant
anything else.
Id.
21. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
22. Id. at 687.
23. Id. at 680. In coming to this conclusion, the Court emphasized that Christmas is a
religious event with a very significant history of celebration in the Western World. Id. The Court
further noted that Christmas has long been recognized as a National Holiday. Id.
24. See id.
25. To decide the issue, the Court also held that the city's sponsorship of the nativity scene
violated neither the primary effect nor the excessive entanglement prongs of the Lemon Test. Id.
at 681-85.
26. Id. at 680. The exact wording of the Lynch Court's opinion attests to its unwillingness
to lightly disregard a government actor's stated secular purpose. The relevant portion reads: "The
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Additionally, the significant benefits to religion resulting from the display
were not enough to convince the Court that the stated secular purpose was
invalid.' In its decision, the Court was once again deferential to the stated
secular purpose of the government action.' However, the Court did not act
so deferentially in Edwards v. Aguillard.29
The Court in Edwardsconsidered whether a statute requiring balanced
treatment of creation and evolution" in schools violated the Establishment
Clause." The officials in charge of implementing the statute contended that
its purpose was to promote the legitimate secular interest of academic
freedom.32 Considering this contention, the Court expanded its analysis of
the purpose prong of the Lemon Test.33 Rather than look solely to whether
the legislature acted with the sincere intent to protect academic freedom,
the Court also considered whether the statute would effectively further this
goal.34
Ultimately, the Court decided that the statute did not further its stated
secular purpose because teachers already possessed the academic freedom
that it was designed to provide.35 Considering this, along with aspects of
the statute's legislative history,36 the Court held that the statute's sole

purpose was to promote the teaching of creationism. 7 Further, the Court

Court has invalidated legislation or governmental action on the ground that a secular purpose was
lacking, but only when it has concluded there was no question that the statute or activity was
motivated wholly by religious considerations." Id.
27. See id.at 680; Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,242 (1986).
28. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680.
29. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
30. The Act prohibited the teaching of evolution in public schools unless creation science is
taught as well. Id. at 581. However, no school is required to teach either theory. Id.
31. Id. at 597.
32. Id. at 586. The Court took the common meaning of academic freedom to be "the freedom
of teachers to teach what they will." Id. The legislature, however, may have intended the phrase to
mean "a basic concept of fairness; teaching all of the evidence." Id. The distinction was not
ultimately important to the Court because it held that the Act did not further the stated purpose
under either interpretation. See id.
33. See id. at 613-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Scalia points out that, in
previous applications of the purpose prong, the Court has considered only the actual motives for
the challenged action. Id. at 613.
34. Id. at 586-87.
35. Id. at 587. The Court noted that no restriction existed prohibiting public school teachers
from teaching any scientific theory that was supported by adequate proof. Id. Based on this, the
Court concluded that the Act did not provide the teachers with any new authority and therefore did
not further the goal of academic freedom. Id.
36. The Court found that the Act's sponsor had expressed a dislike for evolution theory
because it supported beliefs that were contrary to his own. Id. at 592. Further, the sponsor stated
that theories supporting his religious views should be taught in public schools to counter the fact
that evolution was taught. Id.
37. Id. at 593.
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found that this purpose endorsed a particular religious belief and therefore
violated the purpose prong of the Lemon Test." In reaching this
conclusion, the Court embarked on a lengthy explanation of why it did not
accept the statute's stated secular purpose. 9
Much like the Court in Edwards,the instant Court used extrinsic factors
to scrutinize the stated secular purpose of Petitioner's policy.' However,
the instant Court's reasoning for its decision was not as extensive as the
reasoning of the Edwards Court.41 Citing both the text4 2 and evolution of
the petitioner's policy, the instant Court held that the policy's true purpose
was to continue the tradition of prayer before home football games. 43
Further, the instant Court held that this purpose violated the purpose prong
of the Lemon Test.' In reaching this conclusion, the instant Court
examined the wording of Petitioner's policy and inferred that the only type
of message Petitioner would accept was a religious invocation.45 The fact
that Petitioner's stated secular purposes for the policy might have truly
reflected Petitioner's motivations did not dissuade the instant Court from
using the purpose prong of the Lemon Test to invalidate the policy.4
In reaching its decision, the instant Court did not afford Petitioner's
policy the sort of deference that both Lynch and Lemon suggested was
appropriate.47 Instead, the instant Court suggested that it had a duty to
determine whether the stated secular purpose of the policy was sincere."8
By inferring a religious purpose for Petitioner's policy, the Court indicated
it was not bound to afford the policy a presumption of constitutionality.49
The Court might not have afforded the policy this presumption because it
questioned Petitioner's motives for adopting the policy.50

38. Id. at 593-94.
39. See id. at 586-93. The Court's explanation of why it did not accept the statute's stated
secular purpose continues for seven pages and explains in detail why any interpretation ofthe stated
secular purpose could not be considered sincere. See id.The Court also explains that, in light of the
extrinsic evidence and with no valid stated secular purpose to consider, the only purpose it can find
for the statute is religious in nature. See id.
40. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,309 (2000).
41. See id.
42. See supra note 1.
43. Doe, 530 U.S. at 309.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See supra notes 20 and 26 and accompanying text.
48. See Doe, 530 U.S. at 308 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,75 (1985)).
49. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,618 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that the court should not "attribute unconstitutional motives to the States") (quoting Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388,394 (1983)).
50. See Doe, 530 U.S. at 308-09.
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In a strong dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia
and Thomas, argued that, by inferring a religious purpose rather than
accepting Petitioner's plausible, stated secular purpose, the majority
misapplied the purpose prong of the Lemon Test.5 ' Chief Justice Rehnquist
disagreed with the majority's conclusion that Petitioner's policy had no
secular purpose. 52 Particularly, he disapproved of the majority's inference
that the only message Petitioner's policy advocated was a religious
invocation.53 Additionally, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that Petitioner's
attempt to comply with the district court's order by modifying the policy
was evidence of its willingness to adhere to the limits imposed by the
Establishment Clause.' Based on this reasoning, Chief Justice Rehnquist
would have deferred to Petitioner's stated secular purpose and held that the
policy did not violate the purpose prong of the Lemon Test 5
By invalidating Petitioner's policy even though it has a plausible
secular purpose, the instant Court applies the purpose prong of the Lemon
Test more stringently than have previous courts. 56 It makes no mention of
the standard used in Lynch,57 which would require a policy to be wholly
motivated by religious considerations before it is invalidated.5
Additionally, the instant Court relies on several of its own inferences in
concluding that Petitioner's policy has an inappropriate religious purpose 9
Unlike the Court in Edwards,' the instant Court provides very little
reasoning for its conclusion that Petitioner's stated secular purpose is
invalid.6" The limited reasoning that the instant Court does provide rests on
51. Id. at 322-24 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist makes
it clear that he disapproves of the Lemon test and does not feel bound to apply it. Id. at 319-20

(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). However, he goes on to consider the test's application to the instant
case and concludes that Petitioner's policy should not be invalidated. Id. at 320 (Rehnquist, CJ.,
dissenting).
52. Id. at 323-24 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

53. Id. at 322-23 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
54. Id. at 323-24 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Moreover, ChiefJustice Rehnquist found that
Petitioners exceeded what was necessary to comply with the Establishment Clause by adopting a
policy that gave the student speaker an opportunity to deliver either an invocation or a message. Id.
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 319 (Rehnquist, C.J, dissenting).
57. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.

58. See Doe, 530 U.S. at 307-15. The Court questioned whether a football game was an
appropriate occasion for a solemn address. See U at 309. Additionally, the Court found that
limiting the content of the address to material of a solemn nature did not advance the purpose of
fostering free expression. Id. However, the Court did not explain why the goals of promoting good
sportsmanship and student safety and establishing the proper atmosphere for competition were
invalid. See id.at 308-09.
59. See supra text accompanying note 45.
60. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
61. See supra text accompanying note 41.
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its assumption that the only form of message Petitioner's policy approves
of is a religious invocation.62 The Court invalidates the policy because it
finds a religious invocation inadequate to achieve Petitioner's stated
secular purpose.63 However, the text of the policy' provides that either a
message or invocation may be delivered.65 Nowhere does it stipulate that
either must be of a religious nature. 66
The instant Court contends that it is reasonable to infer that Petitioner's
policy favors an invocation because an invocation is the sort of speech
most likely to solemnize an event. 67 Yet, as Chief Justice Rehnquist points
out in his dissent, it is not difficult to think of a solemn message that is not
religious.' By inferring otherwise, the instant Court seems more critical of
Petitioner's stated secular purpose than previous courts would have been.69
Even though the Court in Edwardsinvalidated a statute because it did not
achieve its stated purpose, it did so without relying on the type of
inferences the instant Court makes.7"
Arguably, the instant Court's willingness to make multiple inferences
to invalidate Petitioner's stated secular purpose increases the petitioner's
burden in satisfying the purpose prong of the Lemon Test.7 Under the
instant Court's application, it seems that Petitioner would have to prove
not only that it has a plausible secular purpose for its policy, but also that
no alternative religious purpose exists. This application seems to virtually
do away with the presumption of validity that both Lemon and Lynch
would have afforded Petitioner's stated secular purpose.

62. See Doe,530 U.S. at 309.
63. See id.
64. See supra note 1.
65. Doe, 530 U.S. at 298 n.6.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 309, 314-15.
68. See id.at 322-23 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). The example ChiefJustice Rehnquistgives
of a non-religious solemnizing message is one "urging that a game be fought fairly." Id. at 322.
69. See id. at 319 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
70. See supranotes 35-39 and accompanying text.
71. See supranotes 56-59 and accompanying text. Whilethe Court does notspecifically state
that government actors will be held to a higher standard, its actions are highly indicative of the
proposition. See Doe, 530 U.S. at 308-15. By failing to consider plausible secular motives of the

petitioner's policy and focusing on what the Court considered an alternative purpose to continue
the practice of prayer prior to home football games, see supra note 43, the Court is sending a
message to government actors. See Doe, 530 U.S. at 308-15. The message the Court sends is that
a secular purpose may not be adequate to satisfy the purpose prong of the Lemon Test when it is
possible for the Court to reasonably infer a different religious motivation for the policy. See id. at
309.
72. See id.

73. See supranotes 20 and 26 and accompanying text.
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While the Edwards Court took a large step away from the tradition of
applying the purpose prong of the Lemon Test in a manner that is
deferential to the government actor's stated secular purpose, it did not
abandon the practice completely. 4 The extensive reasoning it provided for
its holding indicated that the Court would not lightly dismiss a government
actor's stated purpose.7' The instant Court, however, exhibits no such
concern. 6 It seems comfortable applying a more stringent version of the
purpose prong, which would invalidate a policy based only on the Court's
own inference that the policy was religiously motivated.' It is questionable
whether the Court intended the purpose prong to impose such a stringent
standard when it created the Lemon Test. 8

74. See supra text accompanying note 34.
75. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
76. See Doe, 530 U.S. at 309, 314-15.
77. See id.
78. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (noting that stated intent must be
afforded deference); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) (noting that a policy
or law should be invalidated under the purpose prong only when ther is no question that it was
wholly motivated by religious considerations); cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,614 (1987)
(noting that, in all previous cases where policies or laws were struck down because they violated
the purpose prong of the Lemon Test, the government actor's sole motive had been to promote
religion).
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